Technical Report for "User-Centric Participatory Sensing: A Game
  Theoretic Analysis" by Mo, Xiaoyan et al.
ar
X
iv
:1
70
8.
09
12
2v
1 
 [c
s.G
T]
  3
0 A
ug
 20
17
Technical Report for “User-Centric Participatory
Sensing: A Game Theoretic Analysis”
Xiaoyan Mo, Zhang Li, Lin Gao, Bin Cao, Tingting Zhang, and Tong Wang
Abstract—Participatory sensing (PS) is a novel and promising
sensing network paradigm for achieving a flexible and scalable
sensing coverage with a low deploying cost, by encouraging
mobile users to participate and contribute their smartphones as
sensors. In this work, we consider a general PS system model with
location-dependent and time-sensitive tasks, which generalizes the
existing models in the literature. We focus on the task scheduling
in the user-centric PS system, where each participating user will
make his individual task scheduling decision (including both the
task selection and the task execution order) distributively. Specif-
ically, we formulate the interaction of users as a strategic game
called Task Scheduling Game (TSG) and perform a comprehensive
game-theoretic analysis. First, we prove that the proposed TSG
game is a potential game, which guarantees the existence of Nash
equilibrium (NE). Then, we analyze the efficiency loss and the
fairness index at the NE. Our analysis shows the efficiency at NE
may increase or decrease with the number of users, depending
on the level of competition. This implies that it is not always
better to employ more users in the user-centric PS system, which
is important for the system designer to determine the optimal
number of users to be employed in a practical system.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background and Motivations
With the development and proliferation of smartphones with
rich build-in sensors and advanced computational capabilities,
we are witnessing a new sensing network paradigm known
as participatory sensing (PS) or mobile crowd sensing (MCS)
[1]–[3], which relies on the active participation and contri-
bution of smartphone users (to contribute their smartphones
as sensors). Comparing with the traditional approach of de-
ploying sensor nodes and sensor networks, this new sensing
scheme can achieve a higher sensing coverage with a lower
deployment cost, and hence it better adapts to the changing
requirement of tasks and the varying environment. Therefore,
it has found a wide range of applications in environment,
infrastructure, and community monitoring [4]–[7].
A typical PS framework often consists of (i) a service
platform (server) residing in the cloud and (ii) a set of
participating smartphone users distributed and travelling on the
ground [1]–[3]. The service platform launches many sensing
tasks, possibly initiated by different requesters with different
data requirements for different purposes; and users subscribe to
one or multiple task(s) and contribute their sensing data. Due
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to the location-awareness and time-sensitivity of tasks and the
geographical distribution of users, a proper scheduling of tasks
among users is critical for a PS system. For example, if a task
is scheduled to a user far away from its target location, the
user may not be able to travel to the target location in time so
as to complete the task successfully.
Depending on who (i.e., the server or each user) will make
the task scheduling decision, there are two types of different
PS models: Server-centric Participatory Sensing (SPS) [8]–
[13] and User-centric Participatory Sensing (UPS) [14]–[18].
In the SPS model, the server will make the task scheduling de-
cision and determine the joint scheduling of all tasks among all
users, often in a centralized manner with complete information
(as in [8]–[13]). In the UPS model, each participating user will
make his individual task scheduling decision and determine the
tasks he is going to execute, often in a distributed manner with
local information (as in [14]–[18]). Clearly, the SPS model as-
signs more control to the server to make the (centralized) joint
scheduling decision, hence can better satisfy the requirements
of various tasks. The UPS model, however, distributes the
control among the participating users and enables each user to
make the (distributed) individual scheduling decision. Hence,
it can faster adapt to the varying environment and the changing
requirement of individual users.
In this work, we focus on the task scheduling in the UPS
model, where the task scheduling decision is made by each
user distributively. Comparing with SPS, the UPS model has
the appealing features of (i) low communication overhead and
(ii) low computational complexity, by distributing the com-
plicated central control (and computation) among numerous
participating users, hence it is more scalable. Therefore, UPS
is particularly suitable for a fast changing environment (where
the information exchange in SPS may become a heavy burden)
and a large-scale system (where the centralized task scheduling
in SPS may be too complicated to compute in real-time), and
hence it has been adopted in some commercial PS systems,
such as Field Agent [19] and Gigwalk [20].
B. Related Work
Many existing works have studied the task scheduling
problem in different UPS models, aiming at either minimizing
the energy consumption (e.g., [14]–[16]) or maximizing the
social surplus (e.g., [17], [18]). Specifically, in [14], Jiang et
al. studied the peer-to-peer based data sharing among users in
mobile crowdsensing, but they considered neither the location-
dependence nor the time-sensitivity of tasks. In [15], Sheng
et al. studied the opportunistic energy-efficient collaborative
sensing for location-dependent road information. In [16], Zhao
Fig. 1. An UPS Model with Location-Dependent Time-Sensitive Tasks. Each
route denotes the task selection and execution order of each user.
et al. studied the fair and energy-efficient task scheduling in
mobile crowdsensing with location-dependent tasks. In [17],
He et al. studied the social surplus maximization for location-
dependent task scheduling in mobile crowdsensing. However,
the above works did not consider the time-sensitivity of tasks,
where each task can be executed at any time. In this work,
we will consider both the location-dependence and the time-
sensitivity of tasks.
Cheung et al. in [18] studied the social surplus maximiza-
tion scheduling for both location-dependent and time-sensitive
tasks, where each task must be executed at a particular time.
Inspired by [18], in this work, we will consider a more general
task model, where each task can be executed within a valid
time period (instead of the particular time in [18]). Clearly,
our task model generalizes the existing models in [14]–[18],
as it will degenerate to the models in [14]–[17] by simply
choosing an infinitely large valid time period for each task, and
degenerate to the model in [18] by simply shrinking the valid
time period of each task to a single point.
C. Solution and Contributions
In this work, we consider a general UPS model consisting of
multiple tasks and multiple smartphone users, where each user
will make his individual task scheduling decision distributively
(e.g., deciding the set of tasks he is going to execute). Tasks are
(i) location-dependent, each associated with one or multiple
target location(s) at which the task will be executed, and (ii)
time-sensitive, each associated with a valid time period within
which the task must be executed.
Moreover, users are geographically dispersed (i.e., each
associated with an initial location) and can travel to different
locations for executing different tasks. As different tasks may
have different valid time periods, each user needs to decide
not only the task selection (i.e., the set of tasks he is going to
execute) but also the execution order of the selected tasks. This
is also the key difference between the task scheduling in our
work and that in [18], which focused on the task selection only,
without considering the execution order.1 Note that our task
scheduling problem (i.e., task selection and order optimization)
is much more challenging than that in [18] (i.e., task selection
only), as even if the task selection is given, the execution order
optimization is still an NP-hard problem.
Figure 1 illustrates an example of such a task scheduling de-
cision in a UPS model with location-dependent time-sensitive
tasks. Each route denotes the task scheduling decision (i.e.,
task selection and execution order) of each user. For example,
user 1 chooses to execute tasks {1, 2, 3, 4} in order, user 2
chooses to execute tasks {5, 1, 6} in order, and user 3 chooses
to execute tasks {7, 8, 9} in order.
Game Formulation: When a user executes a task success-
fully (i.e., at the target location and within the valid time period
1In [18], each task is associated with a particular time, hence the execution
order is inherently given as long as the tasks are selected.
of the task), the user will obtain a certain reward provided by
the task owner. When multiple users execute the same task,
they will share the reward equally as in [18]. This makes the
task scheduling decisions of different users coupled with each
other, leading to a strategic game situation.
We formulate such a game, called Task Scheduling Game
(TSG), and perform a comprehensive game-theoretic analysis.2
Specifically, we first prove that the TSG game is a potential
game [21], which guarantees the existence of Nash equilibrium
(NE). Then we analyze the social efficiency loss at the NE
(comparing with the socially optimal solution) induced by the
selfish behaviors of users. We further show how the efficiency
loss changes with the user number and user type.
In summary, the main results and key contributions of this
work are summarized as follows.
• General Model: We consider a general UPS model with
location-dependent time-sensitive tasks, which general-
izes the existing task models in the literature.
• Game-Theoretic Analysis: We perform a comprehensive
game-theoretic analysis for the task scheduling in the
proposed UPS model, by using a potential game.
• Performance Evaluation: We evaluate the efficiency loss
and the fairness index at the NE under different situations.
Our simulations in practical scenarios with different types
of users (walking, bike, and driving users) show that
the efficiency loss can be up to 70% due to the selfish
behaviors of users.
• Observations and Insights: Our analysis shows the NE
performance may increase or decrease with the number of
users, depending on the level of competition. This implies
that it is not always better to employ more users in the
UPS system, which can provide a guidance for the system
designer to determine the optimal number of users to be
employed in a practical system.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section
II, we present the system model. In Section III and IV, we
formulate the task scheduling game and analyze the Nash
equilibrium. We present the simulation results in Section V,
and finally conclude in Section VI.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
We consider a user-centric UPS system consisting of a
sensing platform and a set N = {1, · · · , N} of mobile smart-
phone users. The platform announces a set S = {1, · · · , S} of
sensing tasks. Each task can represent a specific sensing event
at a particular time and location, or a set of periodic sensing
events within a certain time period, or a set of sensing events
at multiple locations. Each task k ∈ S is associated with a
reward Vk, denoting the money to be paid to the users who
execute the task successfully. Each user can choose the set of
tasks he is going to execute. When multiple users execute the
same task, they will share the reward equally as in [18]. This
2Game theory has been widely used in wireless networks (e.g., [22]–
[27]) for modeling and analyzing the competitive and cooperative interactions
among different network entities.
makes the task scheduling decisions of different users coupled
with each other, resulting in a strategic game situation.
A. Task Model
We consider a general task model, where tasks are (i)
location-dependent: each task k ∈ S is associated with a target
location Lk at which the task will be executed;
3 and (ii) time-
sensitive: each task k ∈ S is associated with a valid time
period Tk , [T
†
k , T
‡
k ] within which the task must be executed.
Examples of such tasks includes the measurement of traffic
speed at a particular road conjunction or the air quality of a
particular location within a particular time interval.
When enlarging the valid time period of each task to
infinity, our model will degenerate to those in [15]–[17]; when
shrinking the valid time period of each task to a single point,
our model will degenerate to the model in [18]. Thus, our
model generalizes the existing models in [15]–[18].
B. User Model
Each user i ∈ N can choose one or multiple tasks (to
execute) from a set of tasks Si ⊆ S available to him. The
availability of a task to a user depends on factors such as
the user’s device capability, time availability, mobility, and
experience. When executing a task successfully, the user can
get the task reward solely or share the task reward equally with
other users who also execute the task. The payoff of each user
is defined as the difference between the achieved reward and
the incurred cost, mainly including the execution cost and the
travelling cost (to be described below).
When executing a task, a user needs to consume some time
and device resource (e.g., energy, bandwidth, and CPU cycle),
hence incur certain execution cost. Such an execution cost
and time depends on both the task natures (e.g., one-shot or
periodic sensing) and the user characteristics (e.g., experienced
or inexperienced, resource limited or adequate). Let Ti,k and
Ci,k denote the time and cost of user i ∈ N for executing task
k ∈ Si. Each user i has a total budget Ci of resource that can
be used for executing tasks.
Moreover, in order to execute a task, a user needs to move
to the target location of the task (in a certain travelling speed),
which may incur certain travelling cost. After executing a task,
the user will stay at that location (to save travelling cost) until
he starts to move to a new location to execute a new task.
By abuse of notation, we denote Li as the initial location of
user i ∈ N . The travelling cost and speed mainly depend on
the type of transportation that the user takes. For example, a
walking user has a low speed and cost, while a driving user
may have a high speed and cost. Let C˜i and Ri denote the
travelling cost (per unit of travelling distance) and speed (m/s)
of user i ∈ N , respectively.
3Note that our analysis can be easily extended to the task model with
multiple target locations, by simply dividing each task into multiple sub-tasks,
each associated with one target location.
C. Problem Description
As different tasks may have different valid time periods,
each user needs to consider not only the task selection (i.e.,
the set of tasks to be executed) but also the execution order of
the selected tasks. As shown in Figure 1, the task execution
order is important, as it affects not only the user’s travelling
cost but also whether the selected tasks can be executed within
their valid time periods. For example, if user 1 executes task
4 first (within the time period [13:00, 14:00], say 13:30), he
cannot execute tasks {1, 2, 3} any more within their valid time
periods (all of which are earlier than 13:30). This is also one
of the key differences between our problem and that in [18],
which only focused on the task selection, without considering
the task execution order.
III. GAME FORMULATION
As mentioned before, when multiple users choose to execute
the same task, they will share the task reward equally. This
makes the decisions of different users coupled with each other,
leading to a strategic game situation. In this section, we will
provide the formal definition for such a game.
A. Strategy and Feasibility
As discussed in Section II, the strategy of each user i ∈ N is
to choose a set of available tasks (to execute) and the execution
order of the selected tasks, aiming at maximizing his payoff.
Such a strategy of user i can be formally characterized by an
ordered task set, denoted by
si , {k
1
i , · · · , k
|si|
i } ⊆ Si (1)
where the j-th element k
j
i denotes the j-th task selected and
executed by user i.
A strategy si = {k1i , · · · , k
|si|
i } of user i is feasible, only if
the time-sensitivity constraints of all selected tasks in si are
satisfied, or equivalently, there exists a reasonable execution
time vector such that all selected tasks in si can be executed
within their valid time periods. Let [T 1i , · · · , T
|si|
i ] denote a
potential execution time vector of user i, where T
j
i denotes the
execution time for the j-th task k
j
i . Then, [T
1
i , · · · , T
|si|
i ] is
feasible, only if (i) it satisfies the time-sensitivity constraints
of all selected tasks, i.e.,
T
†
k
j
i
≤ T ji ≤ T
‡
k
j
i
, j = 1, · · · , |si|, (2)
and meanwhile (ii) it is reasonable in the temporal logic, i.e.,

T 1i ≥
D(i,k1i )
Ri
,
T
j
i ≥ T
j−1
i + Ti,kj−1
i
+
D(kj−1
i
,k
j
i
)
Ri
, j = 2, · · · , |si|,
(3)
where D(i, k1i ) = |Li − Lk1i | denotes the distance between
user i’s initial location Li and the first task k
1
i , D(k
j−1
i , k
j
i ) =
|L
k
j−1
i
−L
k
j
i
| denotes the distance between tasks kj−1i and k
j
i ,
and T
i,k
j−1
i
denotes the time for executing task k
j−1
i .
4
4The first condition denotes that user i needs to take at least the time
D(i,k1i )
Ri
to reach the first task k1i , and the following conditions mean that
user i needs to takes at least the time T
i,k
j−1
i
+
D(k
j−1
i
,k
j
i
)
Ri
to reach task
k
j
i , where the first part of time is used for completing the previous task k
j−1
i
and the second part of time is used for travelling from task k
j−1
i to task k
j
i .
Moreover, a strategy si of user i is feasible, only if it
satisfies the resource budget constraint. That is,∑
k∈si
Ci,k ≤ Ci. (4)
Based on the above, we express in the following lemma the
feasibility conditions for the user strategy si.
Lemma 1 (Feasibility). A strategy si of user i is feasible, if
and only if the conditions (2)-(4) are satisfied.
Intuitively, if one of the conditions in (2)-(4) is not satisfied,
then the strategy si is not feasible as explained early. Thus,
if si is feasible, the conditions (2)-(4) must be satisfied. One
the other hand, if (2)-(4) are satisfied, the strategy si can be
implemented successfully, hence is feasible.
B. Payoff Definition
Given a feasible strategy profile s , (s1, · · · , sN ), i.e., the
feasible strategies of all users, we can compute the number of
users executing task k ∈ S, denoted by Mk(s), that is,
Mk(s) =
∑
i∈N
1(k∈si), ∀k ∈ S, (5)
where the indicator 1(k∈si) = 1 if k ∈ si, and 0 otherwise.
Then, the total reward of each user i ∈ N can be computed by
ri(s) , ri(si, s−i) =
∑
k∈si
Vk
Mk(s)
, (6)
which depends on both his own strategy si and the strategies
of other users, i.e., s−i , (s1, · · · , si−1, si+1, · · · , sN ). The
total execution cost of user i ∈ N can be computed by
cEXi (si) =
∑
k∈si
Ci,k, (7)
which depends only on his own strategy si. The total travelling
cost of user i ∈ N can be computed by
cTRi (si) =
|si|∑
j=1
D(kj−1i , k
j
i ) · C˜i, (8)
which depends only on his own strategy si. Here we use the
index k0i to denote user i’s initial location. Based on the above,
the payoff of each user i ∈ N can be written as follows:
ui(s) , ui(si, s−i) = ri(s)− c
EX
i (si)− c
TR
i (si)
=
∑
k∈si
Vk
Mk(s)
− cEXi (si)− c
TR
i (si).
(9)
C. Task Scheduling Game – TSG
Now we define the Task Scheduling Game (TSG) and the
associated Nash equilibrium (NE) formally.
Definition 1 (Task Scheduling Game – TSG). The Task Se-
lection Game T , (N , {Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) is defined by:
• Player: the set of participating users N = {1, · · · , N};
• Strategy: an ordered set of available tasks si ⊆ Si for
each participating user i ∈ N ;
• Payoff: a payoff function ui(si, s−i) defined in (9) for
each participating user i ∈ N .
A feasible strategy profile s∗ , (s∗1, · · · , s
∗
N ) is an NE of
the Task Scheduling Game T , if
s
∗
i = arg max
si⊆Si
ui(si, s
∗
−i)
s.t. si satisfies (2)-(4),
(10)
for every user i ∈ N .
IV. GAME EQUILIBRIUM ANALYSIS
We now analyze the NE of the Task Scheduling Game.
A. Potential Game
We first show that the Task Scheduling Game T is a po-
tential game [21]. A game is called an (exact) potential game,
if there exists an (exact) potential function, such that for any
user, when changing his strategy, the change of his payoff is
equivalent to that of the potential function. Formally,
Definition 2 (Potential Game [21]). A game G = (N ,
{Si}i∈N , {ui}i∈N ) is called a potential game, if it admits
a potential function Φ(s) such that for every player i ∈ N
and any two strategies si, s
′
i ⊆ Si of player i,
ui(si, s−i)− ui(s
′
i, s−i) = Φ(si, s−i)− Φ(s
′
i, s−i), (11)
under any strategy profile s−i of players other than i.
Lemma 2. The Task Scheduling Game T is a potential game,
with the following potential function Φ(s):
Φ(s) =
∑
k∈S
Mk(s)∑
m=1
Vk
m
−
∑
i∈N
cEXi (si)−
∑
i∈N
cTRi (si), (12)
where Mk(s) is defined in (5), i.e., the total number of users
executing task k under the strategy profile s.
The above lemma can be proved by showing that the condi-
tion (11) holds under the following two situations. First, a user
changes the execution order, but not the task selection. Second,
a user changes the task selection by adding an additional task
or removing an existing task. Due to space limit, we put the
detailed proof in our online technical report [28].
B. Nash Equilibrium – NE
We now analyze the NE of the proposed game. As shown
in [21], an appealing property of a potential game is that it
always admits an NE. In addition, any strategy profile s∗ that
maximizes the potential function Φ(s) is an NE. Formally,
Lemma 3. The Task Scheduling Game T has at least one NE
s
∗ , (s∗1, · · · , s
∗
N ), which is given by
s
∗ , argmax
s
Φ(s)
s.t. si satisfies (2)-(4), ∀i ∈ N ,
(13)
where Φ(s) is the potential function defined in (12).
This lemma can be easily proved by observing that
ui(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i)− ui(s
′
i, s
∗
−i) = Φ(s
∗
i , s
∗
−i)− Φ(s
′
i, s
∗
−i) ≥ 0,
for any user i ∈ N and s′i ⊆ Si. The last inequality follows
because (s∗i , s
∗
−i) is the maximizer of Φ(s) by (13).
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Fig. 2. Social Welfare under SE and NE: (a) Walking Users; (b) Bike Users; (c) Driving Users.
C. Efficiency of NE
Now we show that the NE of the Task Scheduling Game
T , especially the one given by (13), is often not efficient.
Specifically, a strategy profile s◦ is socially efficient (SE),
if it maximizes the following social welfare:
W (s) =
∑
k∈S
Vk ·
(
1Mk(s)≥1
)
−
∑
i∈N
(
cEXi (si)+c
TR
i (si)
)
, (14)
where 1Mk(s)≥1 = 1 if Mk(s) ≥ 1, and 0 otherwise. The first
term denotes the total reward collected by all users, where
the reward Vk of a task k is collected if at least one user
executes the task successfully (i.e., Mk(s) ≥ 1). The second
term denotes the total cost incurred on all users. Formally, the
socially efficient solution s◦ is given by:
s
◦ , argmax
s
W (s)
s.t. si satisfies (2)-(4), ∀i ∈ N .
(15)
By comparing W (s) in (14) and Φ(s) in (12), we can
see that both functions have the similar structure, except the
coefficients for Vk, k ∈ S in the first term, i.e.,
∑Mk(s)
m=1
1
m
and 1(Mk(s)≥1). We can further see that
Mk(s)∑
m=1
1
m
≥ 1(Mk(s)≥1),
where the equality holds only when Mk(s) = 1 (both sides
are 1) or 0 (both sides are 0). Namely, the coefficient for each
Vk in Φ(s) is no smaller than that in W (s). This implies that
for any task, users are more likely to execute the task at the
NE than SE. This leads to the following observation.
Observation 1. The task selections at the NE, especially that
resulting from (13), are more aggressive, comparing with those
at the SE resulting from maximizing W (s).
V. SIMULATIONS
A. Simulation Setting
We choose a 5km×5km region in London as the simulation
area, where tasks and users are randomly distributed in the
area. We simulate a time period of 2 hours, e.g., [10:00, 12:00],
within which each task is initiated randomly and uniformly.
The task valid (survival) time of each task is selected randomly
according to the (truncated) normal distribution with the
expected value of 30 minutes. Each task needs to be started
(but not necessarily to be completed) within its valid time
period. The reward of each task is selected randomly according
to the (truncated) normal distribution with the expected value
of $10 (in dollar). In the simulations, we fix the number of
tasks to 8, while change the number of users from 2 to 20 (to
capture different levels of competition among users).
We consider three types of different users according to their
travelling modes: (i) Walking users, who travel by walking,
with a relatively low travelling speed 5km/h and cost $0.2/km;
(ii) Bike users, who travel by bike, with a medium travelling
speed 15km/h and cost $0.5/km, and (iii) Driving users,
who travel by driving, with a relatively high travelling speed
45km/h and cost $1/km. Each user takes on average 10minutes
to execute a task, incurring an execution cost of $1 (in dollar)
on average. Both the execution time and cost follow the
(truncated) normal distribution as other parameters.
B. Social Welfare Gap
We first show the social welfare gap between the NE and
SE, which captures the efficiency loss of the NE.
Figure 2 presents the expected social welfare under SE and
NE with three different types of users. In the first subfigure
(a), users are walking users with low travelling speed and cost.
In the second subfigure (b), users are bike users with medium
travelling speed and cost. In the third subfigure (c), users are
driving users with high travelling speed and cost. From Figure
2, we have the following observations:
1) The social welfare under SE always increases with the
number of users in all three scenarios (with walking, bike, and
driving users). This is because with more users, it is more
likely that tasks can be executed by lower cost users, hence
resulting in a higher social welfare.
2) The social welfare under NE decreases with the number
of users in most cases. This is because with more users,
the competition among users becomes more intensive, and
the probability that multiple users choosing the same task
increases, which will lead to a higher total execution/travelling
cost and hence a lower social welfare.
3) The social welfare under NE may also increase with the
number of users in some cases. For example, in scenario (a)
with walking users, when the number of walking user is small
(e.g., less than 5), the social welfare under NE increases with
2 5 10 15 20
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
Number of Users
S
o
c
ia
l 
W
e
lf
a
re
 R
a
ti
o
 b
e
tw
e
e
n
 N
E
 a
n
d
 S
E
 (
%
)
(a) Walking Users
(b) Bike Users
(c) Driving Users
Fig. 3. Ratio of Social Welfare between SE and NE.
the number of users slightly. This is because the walking users
often have a limited serving region due to the small travelling
speed, hence there is almost no competition among users when
the number of users is small. In this case, increasing the
number of users will not introduce much competition among
users, but increase the probability that the tasks being executed
by lower cost users, hence resulting in a higher social welfare.
C. Social Welfare Ratio
Figure 3 further presents the social welfare ratio between
NE and SE with three different types of users. We can see
that in all three scenarios, the social welfare ratio decreases
with the number of users. This is because the social welfare
increases with the number of users under SE, while (mostly)
decreases with the number of users under NE, as illustrated
in the previous Figure 2. We can further see that the social
welfare ratio with walking users is higher than those with bike
users and driving users. This is because the competition among
walking users is less intensive than that among bike/driving
users, due to the limited traveling speed and serving region
of walking users. Hence, the degradation of social welfare
under NE (comparing with SE) is smaller with walking users.
More specifically, we can find from Figure 3 that when the
number of users changes from 2 to 20, the social welfare ratio
decreases from 95%, 85%, and 75% to approximately 30%
for walking, bike, and driving users, respectively.
VI. CONCLUSION
In this work, we study the task scheduling in the user-centric
PS system by using a game-theoretic analysis. We formulate
the strategic interaction of users as a task scheduling game, and
analyze the NE by using a potential game. We further analyze
the efficiency loss at the NE under different situations. There
are several interesting directions for the future research. First,
our analysis and simulations show that the social efficiency
loss at the NE can be up to 70%. Thus, it is important to design
some mechanisms to reduce the efficiency loss. Second, the
current model did not consider the different efforts of users in
executing a task. It is important to incorporate the effort into
the user decision.
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